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Investment Securities--Article 8 of
the Uniform Commerical Code
By WILSON W. WYATT*
GENERAL SCOPE AND SmNIFiCANCE OF ARTICLE 8
Article 8 is entitled "Investment Securities", a phrase long
used in business and financial circles, but which is relatively
new to Kentucky statutory law.' The chief significance of Article
8 is that at last there is what may be called a "Negotiable In-
strument Law" dealing with securities. The need for such a law
has been long coming and now that it is here it will provide
a modernized and improved system of handling all transfers of
investment securities. For the first time there is a comprehensive
treatment of the whole transfer problem and all who handle
investment paper should benefit materially from the increased
certainty and simplicity. The Code is not, of course, "all things
to all men," but it nevertheless extends its advantages to all people
with legitimate interests having contacts with investment securi-
ties. Its greatest virtue is that it attempts to modernize the law
in light of the experience of over half a century of unprecedented
commercial growth, which has given rise to tremendous expan-
sion in the field of investment securities. This expansion has
accelerated the need for uniform treatment of security transfers.
Article 8 is the proposed answer to that need.
The security dealer, investment broker, issuing corporation,
purchaser, and, of course, the lawyer are the people most immedi-
ately affected by adoption of Article 8. There is provided to the
security dealer and the investment broker more certainty and
simplicity in handling a multitudinous number of security trans-
* LL.B. 1927, Jefferson School of Law, Attorney, Louisville, Kentucky. Senior
Partner, Wyatt, Grafton & Sloss; Member, Kentucky State Bar Association Com-
mittee for the Uniform Commercial Code; Lieutenant Governor, Commonwealth
of Kentucky. Assisted by H. Wendell Cherry, LL.B. 1959, University of Ken-
tucky, Associate, Wyatt, Grafton & Sloss.
Uniform Commercial Code § 8-101, Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 77, Legis. Research
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fers in their daily business. Their rights, duties and liabilities
are made more certain by the provisions of Article 8 which is,
of course, what businessmen are constantly seeking. For the issuer,
its rights, duties and responsibilities have never been stated
more clearly than they are in Article 8. Likewise the purchaser,
though he may not be as sensitive to his rights until they are in-
vaded, benefits from the provisions of Article 8. His rights on
purchase are fairly explicit, among others, the right to indorse-
ment, the right to requisites for registration, and the right to
rely on certain warranties. Lastly, the lawyer, always seeking
sure clean answers to difficult and perplexing situations, will
now derive lasting benefit from the codification and clarification
of principles contained in Article 8.
Examples of the need for clarification of the law are given in
two rather interesting cases. One had to do with the House of
Morgan, a national house that is still quite solvent, and the other
with the house of Caldwell and Company which is more local,
and which is remembered from the days of the 1930's.
In the Morgan case,2 J. P. Morgan & Company had issued
interim certificates or interim receipts evidencing its readiness
to deliver, as soon as they were available in definitive form, bonds
of the Kingdom of Belgium. These interim receipts were stolen
and passed into the hands of a purchaser for value without
notice. When they were presented, Morgan declined to deliver
the bonds on the ground that the specific words of negoti-
ability were not within the instruments, and therefore they
were not subject to the benefits of the negotiable instruments
law, since they were not for a sum certain in money payable to
bearer on demand.
This was true despite the fact that the interim receipts stated
in clear-cut language that every holder of the certificate and
attached warrant agreed that the undersigned, which of course
was the House of Morgan, could treat the bearer of the certificate
and the attached warrant as the absolute owner as the case may
be, for all purposes, and that Morgan would not be affected by
any notice to the contrary. Nevertheless, because of the absence
of the technical words of negotiability, the court held for the
2 President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E.
594 (1926).
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defendant, and those who were otherwise holders in due course
took subject to all defenses.
Under Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the holder
of those interim receipts would have recovered because the
specific words of negotiability are not required. Article 8 does
not contemplate the use of specific words in determining nego-
tiability.
The Caldwell & Company case is well known in Kentucky,
being referred to popularly as the Ben Hu' case.3 In 1928 Pulaski
County sold $280,000 of its road bonds to Caldwell & Company.
By an arrangement with Caldwell the money was to be left on
deposit and draw interest until it was drawn down by Pulaski
County. Caldwell obligingly agreed to deposit it in the Bank of
Tennessee which turned out to be an affiliate. It also obligingly
agreed to and did collateralize the deposit with $600,000 of
securities, but it developed that these were of another interest
of Caldwell. When Caldwell failed, and the Bank of Tennessee
failed, the $600,000 of securities were worth about $15,000.
In the meantime these bonds had been sold by Caldwell, the
initial buyer, to holders for value without notice. When they
made demand on Pulaski County for payment it was refused.
The buyers brought suit in which the question was whether
or not the bonds were negotiable instruments. This in turn
involved the question whether or not these particular bonds
contained an unconditional promise to pay. Pulaski County
argued they did not on the grounds that the wording of the
bonds made payment conditional on the sufficiency of particular
funds from particular taxes. The Court of Appeals agreed with
that argument and held that the bonds were not negotiable
and the holders took subject to all defenses.
Immediately after the decision there was chaos in the market
of road and bridge bonds of counties of the State of Kentucky
of which there were outstanding a very substantial amount. On
the average they fell approximately thirty points pending nego-
tiations for other bonds; meanwhile the case went back to the
Court of Appeals for rehearing.
After reconsideration, a very long and excellent opinion was
written by the court to the effect that the Pulaski bonds were
3 Pulaski County v. Ben Hur Life Ass'n, 286 Ky. 119, 149 S.W.2d 738 (1941).
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negotiable instruments and that they could be recovered upon
if they were in the hands of a holder for value without notice.
Here is an example where, had the Code been in effect, there
would have been no question whatever about negotiability,
since the formal language of the negotiable instruments law is
not now necessary in order to make a security an investment
security and therefore a negotiable one within the meaning of
Article 8.
Relation of Article 8 to Negotiable Instruments Law and
Uniform Stock Transfer Act
Article 8 is intended to supplant the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law,4 insofar as that law applies to investment securities,
principally registered bonds, and the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act,4a which applies to corporate stock only.
Prior to Article 8 the registered bond and other registered
securities had been left pretty much without statutory guid-
ance. Now under the "functional" definition of securities set forth
in section 8-102, Article 8 will envelope all instruments which
according to common practice are considered investment
securities.
It must be remembered that there are many fields of law
relating to investment securities that are not within the scope
of Article 8 and do not receive comprehensive treatment therein;
particularly the issuance and sale of securities and regulations
of the Securities & Exchange Commission and Blue Sky Law
agencies.
Securities Covered by Article 8
Section 8-102(1) contains the following definition of security:
(a) A "security" is an instrument which:
(i) is issued in bearer or registered form; and
(ii) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities
exchanges or markets or commonly recognized in
any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a
medium for investment; and
(iii) is either one of a class or series or by its terms
is divisible into a class or series of instruments;
and
4Ky. Rev. Stat. ch. 356 (1960) (hereinafter referred to as ICES).
4a KRS ch. 274.
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(iv) evidences a share, participation or other interest
in property or in an enterprise or evidences an
obligation of the issuer.
(b) A writing which is a security is governed by this Art-
icle and not by... [Article 3 on Commercial Paper]
even though it also meets the requirements of that
Article. This Article does not apply to money.
(c) A security is in "registered form" when it specifies a
person entitled to the security or to the rights it
evidences and when its transfer may be registered
upon books maintained for that purpose by or on be-
half of an issuer or the security so states.
(d) A security is in "bearer form" when it runs to bearer
according to its terms and not by reason of any indorse-
ment.
This definition has been described as "functional" in that it does
not prescribe formal requisites which every investment security
must contain as Article 3 does for negotiable instruments.5 For
example, transferable warrants evidencing -rights to subscribe
for shares in a corporation will normally be "securities" within
the definition, since they (a) are issued in bearer ,or registered
form, (b) are of a type commonly dealt in upon securities
markets, (c) constitute a class or series of instruments, and
(d) evidence an obligation of the issuer, namely the obligation
to honor the warrant upon its due exercise and issue shares ac-
cordingly.6 On the other hand a "security" expressly included
in the Kentucky Blue Sky Law would not be included in the
definition if it were not of a type commonly dealt in upon
securities exchanges or markets or commonly recognized as a
medium for investment. Thus a "strait jacket" definition has
been avoided, but instead there is "drawn together the concept
of what is properly Investment Paper-and therefore negotiable
-on a pragmatic basis."8 The purpose of this type of definition
is to cover anything which securities markets, including not only
the organized exchanges but the "over-the-counter" markets as
well, are likely to regard as suitable for trading.'
5 See UCC § 3-104.
6Official comment to UCC § 8-102.
7 Legis. Research Comm'n, Research Pub. No. 49, p. 299 (1957) (herein-
after referred to as Ky. study).
8 Israels, "Article VIII-Investment Securities," 16 Law & Contemp. Prob.
249, 250 (1951). Quoted in New York Study of Article VIII, Document No.
65(I), p. 1880 (1955) (hereinafter referred to as N.Y. Study).
9 Ky. Study 299.
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Other articles of the Code are consistent with this definition,
such as Article 8 (Commercial Paper) which expressly ex-
cludes investment securities from its application.10 Article 8
further provides that a writing which fits the definitions of both
articles is governed by Article 8, not Article 3.11 Article 2 (Sales)
also excludes investment securities. 2 Thus, insofar as possible,
the various articles of the Code are compatible with the defini-
tion of "security" set out in section 8-102.
Since there appears to be no Kentucky statute or case which
defines the word "security," a comparison of existing law with
the definition contained in section 8-102 is impossible. The
Uniform Stock Transfer Act contains no definition of "security"
since it is addressed to a much narrower area-corporate stock.
In Matter of Waldstein,3 the New York court had occasion to
discuss "security" in the following terms:
The term "security" has no exactly defined legal definition.
Generically, the word has reference to written instruments,
usually for the payment of money or evidences of a debt,
and being more than a mere promise of the drawer of a
general liability....
By common usage, however, the term has acquired a much
broader signification. It is now generally used to refer to
instruments for the payment of money, or evidencing title
or equity, with or without some collateral obligation, and
which are commonly dealt in for the purpose of financing
and investment.lsa
The chief significance of the definition of "security" as con-
tained in section 8-102 is that for the first-time transfer of "secur-
ities" is treated separately.
The definition of "security" bears commenting on in terms of
specific requirements set forth under section 8-102. "A security
is an instrument." There is no express stipulation that it be in
writing, but it would be difficult to imagine an unwritten instru-
ment which would meet the terms of section 8-102. The instru-
ment must be "in bearer or registered form," thereby excluding
order paper, which, if in proper form, will be negotiable com-
10ucc § 8-103(1).
11 UCC § 8-102.
12UCC § 2-105(1).
1 160 Misc. 763, 291 N.Y. Supp. 697 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
13a Id. at 767, 291 N.Y. Supp. at 700 (quoted in N.Y. Study at 1882).
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mercial paper under Article 3.14 The instrument must be "of a
type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets
or commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued or
dealt in as a medium for investment." This is the provision which
lends flexibility to the definition of "security," since it obviously
is not tied to specific requisites, but lays down a broad func-
tional criterion in deciding whether or not an instrument is a
"security" within Article 8. Since the instrument must be of a
type commonly dealt in, a question arises as to how new types
of securities will be treated. When the equipment trust cer-
tificate was developed, it was a new type of security and was
issued as a medium for investment. It contained all the neces-
sary requisites for a "security" under Article 8, except, being
a new type, it could not have been "of a type commonly dealt
in .. . or commonly recognized." It appears, therefore, that the
holder of a new type of instrument could not claim the protec-
tion of Article 8 until enough time had elapsed for it to become
commonly recognized as a medium for investment.15 There
might be a period of uncertainty, a "twilight zone," between time
of issuance and the time of acceptance as a commonly recognized
medium for investment. The recognition and application of the
'law merchant" would therefore still have a place under Article
8, since the courts will necessarily have to apply the 'law merch-
ant" in order to determine if an instrument has become com-
monly dealt in as an investment in the financial community.
During this period of uncertainty the new type of instrument
may be so drafted as to place it under the provisions of Article
8, and thereby afford protection to holders.
The requirement that the instrument be "one of a class or
series or by its terms divisible into a class or series of instru-
ments" is to narrow the application of Article 8 to types of secur-
ities widely held. This can be demonstrated by using as an ex-
ample an option to buy securities. A simple option to buy stock
of a corporation of the type used in close corporations would
not be an investment security within the provisions of Article
8; but on the other hand, an option to purchase additional stock
offered to the holders of outstanding shares of a large corpor-
14 N.Y. Study 1882.15 Id. at 1883.
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ation would be included. 6 Obviously there is an area where a
close corporation with four or five holders of outstanding stock
would give rise to problems in regard to whether or not the
option is of a class or series. These situations, of course, would
ultimately be resolved by construction and application of this
section to the particular facts in each case.
The requirement that the instrument evidence "a share,
participation or other interest in property or in an enterprise"
or evidence "an obligation of the issuer" is descriptive of invest-
ment securities as that term is used. It has already been noted
that a writing which meets the definition of a "security" under
Article 8 is governed by that article, and not Article 3, even
though it meets the requirements for negotiable paper under
Article 8. This can be illustrated by the practice of installment
buying, whereby the purchaser signs a set of promissory notes due
at regular intervals. While not commonly dealt in on securities
markets, such notes are certainly recognized as a "medium for
investment." As the notes are payable to bearer they would
qualify under the definition of Article 8 and be governed by
that article even though the notes are commonly regarded as
commercial paper, not investment securities. 1
An instrument must be either in registered form or payable
to bearer as one of the requisites of being a "security" under
section 8-102(c) (1). Subsection (c) provides, "A security is in
registered form when it specifies a person entitled to the security
... and when its transfer may be registered upon books main-
tained for that purpose ...or the security so states." Thus a
security by its terms must indicate it is in registered form.
Literal interpretation of this requirement would seem to demand
that the exact words appear on the stock certificate. As it is, the
most common stock certificate form merely provides that the
stock is transferable on the books of the corporation. The
statement that such books are "maintained for that purpose'
does not usually appear upon the certificate. Though this is a
minor formal matter, it may indicate that a slight change in
form of stock certificates might be necessary under the Code.
However, this section can be reasonably interpreted so that no
16 Id. at 1884.
17 Id. at 1884-85.
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statement need appear on the stock certificate in regard to
whether books are maintained for the purpose of transfer. Thus
if, as a fact, books are kept for registering transfers, this would
seem to meet the "registered" requirement.
An instrument though not in registered form, may qualify
as a "security" under section 8-102 if it is in bearer form. A
"security" is in bearer form when it runs to bearer according to
its terms and not by reason of any indorsement. Thus, under
Article 8 an instrument will be payable to bearer only when
it so states.
The preceding has been a discussion of the major requisites
laid down by section 8-102 in order that an instrument qualify
as a "security" under Article 8. To complete the analysis of the
definition set forth in the section, the following is a list of in-
struments which either come within the definition of "security,"
do not come within the definition, or about which there is some
doubt. Instruments issued in usual form which probably come
within the definition of a "security" include: (1) government
bonds; (2) corporation bonds and debentures; (3) collateral
trust and income bonds; (4) corporate stocks; (5) equipment
trust certificates; (7) voting trust certificates; (8) investment
trust and mutual fund shares; (9) bond coupons; (10) land
trust certificates; (11) fractional undivided interest in oil, gas
and mineral leases; (12) co-operative apartment stock; (13)
stock purchase warrants; and (14) stock dividend rights. In-
struments issued in usual form which will probably not be secur-
ities as defined by section 8-102 are: (1) proxies; (2) checks;
(3) bills of exchange; (4) travellers checks; (5) brokers tickets;
(6) bank certificates of deposit; (7) documentary letters of credit;
(8) pawn tickets; (9) government auditor's warrants; (10) single
stock options; and (11) partnership agreements. Instruments
about which there is some question as to whether they are
"securities" under section 8-102: (1) puts, calls and straddles
(there may be some difficulty since these instruments do not
appear to be "one of a class or series or divisible into a class or
series of instruments") and (2) stock subscription contracts.
As a subscription to a proposed corporation, a subscription con-
tract would not bind and therefore would not "evidence an ob-
ligation of the issuer"; as a subscription to an existing corpor-
1960]
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ation the only way to transfer would be by assignment, and this
does not meet the "bearer" requirement.'
s
Added flexibility to the concept of "security" is attained by
virtue of section 8-202(1), which provides that terms may be
incorporated in the security by reference to another instrument.
This section reads as follows:
(1) Even against a purchaser for value and without notice,
the terms of a security include those stated on the security
and those made part of the security by reference to another
instrument, indenture or document or to a constitution,
statute, ordinance, rule, regulation, order or the like to the
extent that the terms so referred to do not conflict with
the stated terms. Such a reference does not of itself charge
a purchaser for value with notice of a defcet going to the
validity of the security even though the security expressly
states that a person accepting it admits such notice.
Under present Kentucky law a promise or order is not so
qualified as to make it conditional if there is merely on the in-
strument a statement of the transaction which gives rise to the
instrument, or an indication of a particular fund out of which
reimbursement is to be made, or a particular account to be
debited.19 Still left open is the question of whether the elements
of negotiability must appear on the instrument itself. Read
broadly, section 8-202(1) would seem to allow some of the
elements to be contained in an outside instrument. It is doubtful
if the court would construe the section so broadly, but would
merely allow reference to any extrinsic document whose terms
should be cited as a matter of course in drafting the instrument.
Read in this fashion section 8-202(1) would seem to be in line
with existing Kentucky law on this point. Such outside instru-
ments are not binding against purchasers for value without notice
if they conflict with the stated terms in the instrument. More-
over, such reference does not of itself charge a purchaser for
value with notice of a defect going to the validity of the secur-
ity even though the security states that a person accepting it
admits such notice. Obviously, this in effect favors the purch-
aser for value in respect to being placed on notice of defects.
18The above breakdown is taken from N.Y. Study 1887-89.
19 Pulaski County v. Eichstaedt, 110 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1940); Natl Deposit
Bank v. Ohio Oil Co., 250 Ky. 288, 62 S.W.2d 1048 (1933).
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Presumptions; Securities Negotiable
Section 8-105 provides as follows:
(1) Securities governed by this Article are negotiable
instruments.
(2) In any action on a security
(a) unless denied in the pleadings, each signature on
the security or in a necessary indorsement is ad-
mitted;
(b) when the effectiveness of a signature is put in
issue the burden of establishing it is on the party
claiming under the signature but the signature
is presumed to be genuine or authorized;
(c) when signatures are admitted or established pro-
duction of the instrument entitles a holder to re-
cover on it unless the defendant establishes a
defense or a defect going to the validity of the
security; and
(d) after it is shown that a defense or defect exists
the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that
he or some person under whom he claims is a
person against whom the defense or defect is
ineffective ....
The purposes of this section are (1) to preserve and make secur-
ities eligible for investments under certain state acts restricting
'legal" investments to negotiable instruments,2 ° and (2) to set
out applicable rules as to proof of signatures and to the burden of
proof after signatures are admitted or established. These provi-
sions are the same as those applicable to actions on commercial
paper.2' This negotiability provision only states a conclusion
which is implicit in Article 8; namely, that investment securities
are negotiable instruments. Those states, including Kentucky,
which do not have statutory requirements restricting 'legal" in-
vestments to negotiable instruments will not be affected by the
provision stating negotiability. Subsection (2) regarding proof
of signature and burden of proof is generally in line with the
rules set out in the Negotiable Instruments Law.
22
Law Applicable
Section 8-106 provides as follows:
2o Ky. Study 301.
21 UCC § 3-807.
22 KRS § 356.059.
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The validity of a security and the rights and duties of the
issuer with respect to registration of transfer are governed
by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the
jurisdiction of organization of the issuer.
This section states a specific conflicts rule applicable in the in-
vestment securities field. It follows the great weight of authority
which holds that stock in a corporation has its situs in the juris-
diction in which the corporation was organized and that ques-
tions as to its title and transfer are governed by the law of that
jurisdiction. 3 There is no Kentucky statute on this point.
23Ky. Study 301. Husband v. Linehan, 168 Ky. 304, 181 S.W. 1089 (1916)
is generally in accord. See also Annot., 131 A.L.R. 192 (1941).
IssuER's DEFNSEs, BiGHrs AND 13EsPoNsiBILITrrs
Issuer Defined
Section 8-201 provides:
(1) With respect to obligations on or defenses to a security"issuer" includes a person who
(a) places or authorizes the placing of his signature
on a security (otherwise than as authenticating
trustee, registrar, transfer agent or the like) to
evidence that it represents a share, participation
or other interest in his property or in an enter-
prise or to evidence his duty to perform an ob-
ligation evidenced by the security; or
(b) directly or indirectly creates fractional interests
in his rights or property which fractional inter-
ests are evidenced by securities; or
(c) becomes responsible for or in place of any other
person described as an issuer in this section.
(2) With respect to obligations on or defenses to a security
a guarantor is an issuer to the extent of his guaranty
whether or not his obligation is noted on the security.
(3) With respect to registration of transfer (Part 4 of this
Article) "issuer" means a person on whose behalf
transfer books are maintained.
The main purpose of this section is to attain a definition of a
person liable on an instrument which is adaptable to investment
securities.24 This definition of "issuer" includes a maker, a drawer,
an acceptor and an accommodation party-such parties formerly
240Oficial comment to UCG § 8-201.
25KRS §§ 856.029, .060, .061, .062. See Ky. Study 303.
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being defined in the NIL.25 A definition of "issuer" is needed
since, as stated before in the discussion of section 8-102, Article
8 includes many types of securities not covered by the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law. Therefore the definition of one
who is to be liable on a security must be flexible enough to cover
all instruments which qualify as securities under Article 8. For
this reason the definition of "issuer" is for purposes of Article
8 only and has no implications with respect to other statutes
using the same term in a different sense.
The phrase "places . . . his signature" effects no change since
it is in line with KRS section 356.001, which requires negotiable
instruments to be "in writing and signed by the maker." Nor does
the phrase "authorizes the placing of his signature" create a
change since this is substantially in accord with KRS section
856.019, which provides that "the signature of any party may be
made by an agent duly authorized in writing."
Authenticating trustees, registrars and transfer agents are
excluded from the definition of "issuer" since the obligations of
these persons are governed by sections 8-406 and 8-208.
The statement in subsection (1) (a) that the security must
"represent a share, participation or other interest in his prop-
erty or in an enterprise or to evidence his duty to perform an ob-
ligation evidenced by the security" is in line with the "func-
tional" definition of security contained in section 8-102. Para-
graph (c), which states that an "issuer" includes a person who
"becomes responsible for or in place of any other person described
as an issuer," is intended to pick up the liabilities of successor
corporations after merger or consolidation.
Subsection (2) sets out the liability of a guarantor with re-
spect to obligations on or defense to a security. By this sub-
section a guarantor "is an issuer to the extent of his guaranty
whether or not his obligation is noted on the security." Typically,
guarantors are parent corporations or stand in some similar re-
lationship to the principal obligor. If that relationship existed
at the time the security was originally issued the guaranty would
probably have been noted on the security. However, if the
relationship arose afterward, through a purchase of stock or
properties, or through merger or consolidation, probably the
notation would not appear. Nonetheless the holder of the security
1960]
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is entitled to the benefit of the obligation of the guarantor. 26
Lastly, subsection (3) is intended to narrow the definition
of "issuer" for purposes of Part 4 of Article 8 (Registration of
Securities) by stating that an "issuer" for purposes of Part 4
"means a person on whose behalf books are maintained." This
provision is made necessary by the fact that the provisions of
Part 4 contemplate a narrower meaning of the term "issuer."
Validation of Defective Issues
Of all the sections in Part 2 dealing with rights, defenses and
responsibilities of the "issuer", the most important single provi-
sion is section 8-202 which contains general provisions that
operate to validate, in the hands of purchasers and subsequent
purchasers for value without notice, certain "defects" which go
to the "validity" of a security. To begin with, the definition of
"purchaser" and "subsequent purchaser" should be made explicit
so as to distinguish between them. A "purchaser" is one who
takes by purchase, 7 and therefore includes a person taking on
original issue, while a "subsequent purchaser" is a person who
takes other than by original issue.28 Thus a "subsequent purch-
aser" cannot be a purchaser of original issue, but is a "purchaser"
in the broader sense. This distinction should be kept in mind,
since section 8-202 provides different results depending upon
whether a holder of a security is a "purchaser" or "subsequent
purchaser." Since subsection (1) of section 8-202 has previously
been discussed, only the remaining portion of that section will
now be set out.
(2) (a) A security other than one issued by a govern-
ment.., even though issued with a defect going
to its validity is valid in the hands of a purchaser
for value and without notice of the particular de-
fect unless the defect involves a violation of con-
stitutional provisions in which case the security
is valid in the hands of a subsequent purchaser
for value and without notice of the defect.
(b) The rule of subparagraph (a) applies to an issuer
which is a government or governmental agency
or unit only if either there has been substantial
compliance with the legal requirements govern-
26 UCC § 8-201, offcial comment 2.
2 UCC § 1-201 (33).
28UCC § 8-102(3).
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ing the issue or the issuer has received a substan-
tial consideration for the issue as a whole or for
the particular security and a stated purpose of
the issue is one for which the issuer has power
to borrow money or issue the security.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in the case of certain
unauthorized signatures on issue (Section 8-205), lack
of genuineness of a security is a complete defense even
against a purchaser for value and without notice.
(4) All other defenses of the issuer including nondelivery
and conditional delivery of the security are ineffective
against a purchaser for value who has taken without
notice of the particular defense.
The underlying concept of this provision is that the "issuer",
not the purchaser, should make sure that the security complies
with the law governing its issue. Except for "over-issue", which
is a "real defense" even under this section, discussion of which
is deferred until section 8-104 is discussed, stockholders are en-
titled to a fully negotiable certificate. This protection extended to
stockholders against an issuer's defenses is, according to some
noted authorities, one of the most important contributions of
Article 8.20 Thus, section 8-202 validates most defective secur-
ities in the hands of innocent purchasers, instead of allowing
damages against the issuer.s0
The Kentucky cases appear to be in accord with subsection
(2) (a), which would validate defective securities (other than
ones issued by governmental agencies) in the hands of bona
fide purchasers where the defect consisted of violation of statu-
tory provisions and in the hands of bona fide subsequent purch-
asers where the defect consisted of violation of constitutional
provisions.31 In Taylor v. Citizens Oil Company,3 2 the court said:
One who in good faith for value purchases stock from a
third person, without knowledge that the stock had been
obtained from the company without the payment of an
equivalent in value to its par, is not subject to the consti-
tutional prohibition, which declares "all fictitious increase
29 See Israels, supra note 8; Sherman & Fenney, 'xamination of the Nego-
tiability Concept of the Uniform Commercial Code," 3 Wash. U. L. Q. 303 (1953).
3OUCC § 8-202, official comment 3.
31 People's State Bank v. Jacksonian Hotel Co., 261 Ky. 166, 87 S.W.2d
111 (1935); Hess v. Trumbo, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 320, 84 S.W. 1153 (Ct. App. 1905).
See also Taylor v. Citizens Oil Co., 182 Ky. 350, 206 S.W. 644 (1918) (failure
to comply with constitutional provisions).32 Supra note 31.
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of stock shall be void;" but one who takes stock from a
company in payment for property of less market value
than the par of the stock so issued does come within the
prohibition, and the part which is in excess of the market
value of the thing given in payment therefor is fictitious,
and therefore voidable at the suit of the corporation.
33
Also in accord with subsection (2) (a) is KRS section 856.057
which provides that a holder in due course holds an instrument
"free from any defect of title of prior parties and free from de-
fenses available to prior parties among themselves."
It should be noted that subsection (2) (a) by its terms does
not touch the relationship between the issuer and a purchaser
who takes on original issue where the defect consisted of a vio-
lation of a constitutional provision. This situation is left to the
law of the particular state. Presumably Kentucky would not pro-
tect a bona fide purchaser on original issue where a constitu-
tional defect exists. 4
Validation of Government Issues
Government issuers are treated separately in subsection (2)
(b) so as to distinguish them from other issuers as a matter of
public policy. Some additional safeguards are imposed before
governmental issues are validated.33  This section operates to
validate defective securities in the hands of bona fide purchasers,
just as subsection (2) (a) does, under either of the following
two circumstances: (1) where there has been substantial com-
pliance with the legal requirements governing the issue, or (2)
substantial consideration has been received and a stated purpose
of the issue is one for which the issuer has power to borrow
money. The above construction is placed on this section by the
Code editors. 6
However, a problem of construction presented by this sub-
section is whether the phrase "and a stated purpose of the issue
is one for which the issuer has power to borrow money or issue
the security" modifies the phrase "or the issuer has received sub-
stantial consideration for the bond issue as a whole or for the
particular security," which it directly follows, or whether it also
33 182 Ky. at 862, 206 S.W. at 650.
34 Taylor v. Citizens Oil Co., supra note 81.
35 UCC § 8-202, official comment 6.
36 Ibid.
[Vol. 48,
INvEsMNT SEcuRrrrEs
applies to the preceding phrase "where there has been a sub-
stantial compliance with the legal requirements governing the
issue." It is possible that the words "and a stated purpose" go
with both phrases.
Assuming that the editor's construction is proper, there are
some problems which will be presented when this section is
applied to given fact situations. It appears that this section is
designed to adopt, under certain circumstances, a long and
well established line of federal cases which recognize the prin-
ciple of estoppel in favor of bona fide purchasers where munici-
palities issue bonds which contain recitals of compliance with
governing constitutional and statutory provisions made by the
municipal authorities entrusted with determining such com-
pliance.3 7 However, it appears that Kentucky decisions are
contra to the Code provisions which would protect subsequent
purchasers for value and without notice of a defect, where the
defect involves a violation of constitutional provisions. In Pulaski
County v. Ben Hur Life Association8s the court stated:
[Municipal] bonds issued in excess of the [constitutional
and statutory] limitations are void in the hands of any
person, whether a bona fide holder or not, although they
are valid up to the amount allowed by the limiting provi-
sions. If part only of the issue is excessive, then each bond
is to be treated as partly valid and partly void and its due
proportion to the whole debt attempted to be incurred
may be recovered.
39
It would seem a fortiori that a bona fide purchaser on original
issue would not be protected where a constitutional defect exists.
Also KRS section 422.140 provides:
No conduct, statement or representation of any officer of
any county, city or taxing district, shall be received as
evidence against or served to estop the county, city or
taxing district from contesting the legality of any tax or
indebtedness authorized or created by it in excess of the
constitutional or legal limits relating thereto.
8 7 Knott County v. Aid Ass'n for Lutherans, 140 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1944);
Woodmen of the World v. Clay County, 84 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. Ky. 1943);
Woodmen of the World v. Rowan County, 23 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Ky. 1938);
Dietrich v. Bath County, 292 Fed. 279 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1909).
88 286 Ky. 119, 149 S.W.2d 738 (1941).
$Old. at 137, 149 S.W.2d at 747.
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In view of this section it appears doubtful that a bona fide
purchaser would be able to rely on recitals contained in the
bonds as forming a basis for the application of the estoppel
principle, insofar as alleged defenses of invalidity of the bonds
were due to their exceeding the constitutional debt limit pro-
visions.
The purpose of the requirement that substantial compliance
be made with the statutory provisions is to make certain that a
mere technicality, such as the manner of publishing election
notices or the number of days on which notice must be pub-
lished, shall not be a ground for depriving an innocent purchaser
of his rights in the security.4 ° Kentucky has generally recognized
this principle. However, the second alternative that may be in-
voked to validate a defect in the issue is more worthy of com-
ment. Under this alternative it appears that if substantial con-
sideration has been received and a stated purpose of the issue
is one for which the issuer has power to borrow money, then the
defect, whether it be statutory or constitutional, is validated in
the hands of a bona fide subsequent purchaser. As stated before,
there are Kentucky cases directly contra to this result, and the
question arises as to what will be the outcome of this clash be-
tween the Code and existing case law. Certainly constitutional
provisions control statutory provisions, thus making it absurd
to contend that this section of the Code abrogates the relevant
constitutional provisions. It could be construed as a direction
on the part of the legislators to the courts to apply the estoppel
principle embodied in the federal cases to situations where the
government is the issuer. However, the doctrine of estoppel
applies to those situations where the issuer states that it has
complied with all relevant statutory and constitutional provi-
sions governing the issue. What would result if the security made
no such recital? Perhaps new criteria have been formulated as
a prerequisite for application of the estoppel doctrine? Let us
suppose a situation where the governmental issuer has received
a substantial consideration for the issue and a stated purpose of
the issue is one for which the issuer has the power to borrow
money or issue the security; for example, a city borrowing to
expand its sewer system. What if the issue exceeds debt ceilings
40 UCC § 8-202, official comment 6.
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imposed by the constitution? It seems that this is a situation
where the issuer lacks constitutional power or capacity to ob-
ligate itself, but a valid purpose is involved and a substantial con-
sideration has been received. Under this section the defect
would evidently be validated in the hands of a bona fide subse-
quent purchaser, even though the issue exceeded constitutional
debt limits. This would be a strict departure from existing Ken-
tucky law. Looking upon this section as a legislative attempt to
provide validation of constitutional defects, it would appear that
it could not control the constitutional provisions concerning
capacity of the governmental issuer. If, however, the court con-
strues the section as a direction to apply the doctrine of estoppel
in these situations, then the section may be effective. Any stat-
utory provision, such as KRS section 422.140, supra, which miti-
gates against the use of estoppel would necessarily be overturned
by this section of Article 8. Several problems can be visualized
in connection with the application of this section. Among others,
the requirements contained in the County Debt Act41 could
very well be abrogated by the application of the "substantial
consideration-valid purpose" alternative provided in subsection
(2) (b). In conclusion it would appear that a body of case law
will have to be evolved in order that this area be made more
clear and certain.
Subsection (8) of section 8-202 retains the "real defense" of
lack of genuineness of the security as a defense available to the
issuer. "Genuineness" means free of "forgery or counterfeiting,"
This defense, fo course, is qualified by section 8-205 where in
some instances the issuer is held on an unauthorized signature.
Lack of genuineness of an instrument was a real defense under
the NIL.
Subsection (4) of section 8-202 provides that all other de-
fenses of the issuer including nondelivery of the security are
ineffective against a purchaser for value without notice. This
subsection has been criticized as too broad, since the same sec-
tion allows the defenses of: (1) violation of constitutional pro-
visions against original holders; and (2) no substantial com-
pliance or consideration to governmental issuers. In addition,
41KRS §§ 66.280, .390.
42UCC § 1-201(18).
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as will be seen, over-issue can be raised under section 8-104
against purchasers seeking validation, and the defense of stale-
ness could also be raised under certain circumstances under sec-
tion 8-203.43 The purpose of this section, though by its terms
it may be slightly broad, is to make explicit the fact that all
other defenses other than those provided for in the Code are
ineffective against a purchaser for value without notice. This
section is in accord with KRS section 356.016 which provides
in part:
[W] here the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due
course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him
so as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed.
Subsection (5) of section 8-202 isolates "when, as and if issued"
contracts to make clear that this section does not affect the pres-
ently recognized right of either party to cancel the contract on
substantial change.
Issuer's Restrictions
Section 8-204 concerns the effect of issuer's restrictions on
securities, and provides that unless noted conspicuously on the
security a restriction on transfer imposed by the issuer, even
though lawful, is ineffective except against a person with actual
knowledge of it. Thus the restriction need not be set out in full
but need only be "noted." Most jurisdictions, as does Kentucky,
recognize the right of issuers to impose restrictions giving either
the issuer itself or other stockholders the option to purchase the
security at an ascertained price before it is offered to third
parties. This is the type of restriction contemplated by this sec-
tion. This section does not alter the prevailing case law which
recognizes free alienability as an inherent attribute of securities
and holds invalid unreasonable restraints on alienations, such as
those requiring consent of directors without establishing criteria
for granting or withholding such consent.44 Kentucky follows
this rule. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act contains a similar
provision," but is applicable only to stock transfers. Section
8-204 is limited to issuer's restrictions and a person with actual
knowledge of the restriction is bound by the restriction, even
though it is not noted conspicuously on the security.
43N.Y. Study 1914-15.
44UCC § 8-204, official comment 2.
45 KRS § 274.150.
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Staleness
Section 8-203 effects a direct change in existing Kentucky
law in that it extends the time after maturity within which a
purchaser of a security may still be considered a bona fide
purchaser. By virtue of KRS section 356.052, one of the pre-
requisites for a holder in due course is that such holder obtain
the instrument before it is overdue. KRS section 356.053 provides:
Where an instrument payable on demand is negotiated
an unreasonable length of time after its issue, the holder
is not deemed a holder in due course.
Section 8-203 extensively modifies the prior Kentucky rule that
a holder in due course must take before maturity, by extending
the time limit in some cases up to two years from date of ma-
turity where no funds or securities are made available for pay-
ment on maturity. Otherwise, a person may be a bona fide pur-
chaser if he purchases within one year from the time the right
to immediate performance accrues. This section does not ex-
tend the life of preferred stocks, called for redemption, beyond
the redemption date. After such call the security represents only
a right to the funds set aside for redemption.46
As will be noted later, different time limitations apply when
the question is notice, not of the issuer's defenses, but of claims
of ownership.47
Forgery; Want of Authority
Section 8-205 delineates the specific instances where an issuer
will be estopped from alleging forgery or want of authority.
Under the NIL,48 a forged or unauthorized signature is wholly
unoperative unless the party against whom any rights are as-
serted "is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of
authority." This section makes explicit the circumstances under
which such preclusion arises. In effect, the issuer is made re-
sponsible for unauthorized conduct on the part of those en-
trusted with the signing or immediate preparation for signing of
the security or similar securities; or of the employees of those
persons who have the responsibility of handling the security.
The determination of who these persons are will, of course, de-
pend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
46 UCC § 8-203, official comment 2.
47Ky. Study 308.
48KRS § 356.023.
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Section 8-205 lays down adequate criteria for making such de-
termination. This section is in line with the spirit of the Code
to favor the innocent purchaser and to place the responsibility
on the issuer to see that trusted personnel handle such issues.
The issuer may protect himself against fraud by careful selec-
tion and bonding of agents and employees. However, the issuer
under this section will not be liable for the dishonesty of em-
ployees not so entrusted with signing, preparation or responsible
handling of similar securities and whose commission of forgery
it has no reason to anticipate.4 9 The protection of this section
extends to all purchasers for value without notice.
Nondelivery of Incomplete Instrument
Section 8-206, which is closely related to section 8-205, effects
a change in existing Kentucky law by eliminating nondelivery
of an incomplete instrument as a real defense against a good
faith purchaser for value. Under prior law, an instrument which
"has not been delivered will not, if completed and negotiated
without authority, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder
or against any person whose signature was placed thereon be-
fore delivery."5  Under section 8-206, even though blanks are
incorrectly filled in, and even though there has been no delivery
by the issuer, the purchaser for value without notice can re-
cover. This section goes further than the present NIL in pro-
tecting the bona fide purchaser.51 Section 8-206(1) (a) seems
to be in line with the NIL rule that any person may complete
the instrument by filling in the blanks as authorized.52 Under
subsection (2) an altered security may be enforced according
to its original terms by any holder. This would seem to modify
the previous NIL rule which provided that only a holder in due
course could enforce an altered security according to its or-
iginal tenor.
The protection afforded to a purchaser by this section is
modified to the extent that an overissue may result where an
incorrect amount is filled in the blank.53 Section 8-104 would
govern this situation.
49 UCC § 8-205, official comment 2.
5o KRS § 356.015.
51 Ky. Study 309-10.
52 See KRS § 356.014.
53 UCC § 8-206, official comment 4.
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Section 8-207 probably effects no change in existing law,
except that the issuer's rights with respect to registered holders
is now stated affirmatively and express protection given until
the security is duly presented for registration of transfer. This
provision extends the element of certainty to the issuer in re-
gard to its dealing with holders of stock. This section is also in
line with KRS section 274.030, which provides that an issuer
may recognize the registered owner as the person exclusively
entitled to vote or receive dividends. Section 8-207 does not
effect a change as to the liability of registered owners for calls
and assessments.54
Section 8-208 spells out the warranties inherent in the sig-
nature of an authenticating trustee, registrar or transfer agent.
Such person warrants that (1) the security is genuine (free from
forgery or counterfeiting); (2) is in proper form; (3) that his
participation is within his capacity and scope of authorization,
and (4) that he has reasonable grounds to believe that the
security is within the amount the issuer is authorized to issue.
These warranties run to a purchaser for value, and there are no
previous statutory provisions covering the liabilities of such
parties. This section will be noted later in the discussion of
"over-issue."
Issuer's Lien
A lien upon a security in favor of an issuer is valid against
a purchaser only if the right of the issuer to such a lien is noted
conspicuously on the security.55 This rule is concomitant to the
rule as to restrictions on transfer imposed by the issuer.5" "Noted"
makes clear that the text of the lien provisions need not be set
forth in fUIll. r The word "conspicuously" as defined by the Code
is a term so written that a reasonable person against whom it is
to operate ought to have noticed it.58
PROBLFMS OF OVEn-IssuE AND E MEDES
Section 8-104 adopts the universally recognized prohibition
against over-issue, which is in line with existing Kentucky law.59
54 See KIRS § 274.030.
MSUC § 8-103.
n UCC § 8-204.
57 UCC § 8-103, official comment.
58UCC § 1-201(10).
59 Leffingwell v. Evans, 185 Ky. 351, 216 S.W. 58 (1919).
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Unfortunately, according to some authorities, it has been neces-
sary to maintain the "sacrosanct character of over-issue."60
Various times at meetings where this article was considered, at-
tempts to insert in section 8-104 provisions that would require
charter amendment to obtain new shares were defeated, pre-
sumably because this would be coercing the shareholders to
perform an act which under the statutes should be wholly
voluntary.
Replacement or Damages
Under section 8-104 a purchaser of over-issue may compel
the issuer to obtain and deliver to him an identical security, if
reasonably available for purchase. If a security of this type is
not so available, the person entitled to issue or validation may
recover from the issuer the price he or the last purchaser for
value paid for it. New to Kentucky law is the provision which
would compel the issuer to purchase and deliver to the purch-
aser an identical security if reasonably available for purchase.
Also, the alternative remedy of damages is supplemented by a
definite measure of damages to be applied when the purchaser
avails himself of that remedy. The right to maintain an action
for damages against the corporation for over-issue is well settled
in Kentucky. 61 Some question, however, has surrounded the
measure of damages. The value paid by the last purchaser plus
interest from the date of demand is now the measure of dam-
ages. Thus, where there is an over-issue the purchaser has alter-
native courses of action under section 8-104. Where an identical
security is reasonably available for purchase, whether because
traded on an organized market, or because one or more holders
may be willing to sell at a not unreasonable price, the issuer,
although unable to issue additional shares, will be able to pur-
chase them and may be compelled to follow that procedure."
If such remedy is not available then the purchaser is left to his
damages. As noted before, under section 8-208 the purchaser of
over-issue has a remedy against an authenticating trustee, reg-
istrar or transfer agent based upon breach of warranty. This
warranty runs to all purchasers for value and an action may be
6D Israels, supra note 8, at 254.
61 Leffingwell v. Evans, supra note 59.
62 UCC § 8-104, official comment 2.
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had based upon breach of such warranty. This action would of
course be subject to the defense that the trustee, registrar or
transfer agent, under the circumstances, had reasonable grounds
to believe that the issue was within the authorized amount.
Over-Issue Cannot Be Validated
An important observation that should be made in regard to
section 8-104 is that it controls the rules otherwise laid down
in this article as to the validation and issue of securities. In par-
ticular section 8-202, the general provision dealing with valida-
tion of defective securities in the hands of innocent purchasers,
in no way operates to validate an over-issue. Although gen-
erally regarded as a defect going to the validity of the security,
over-issue is an exception to the rule of section 8-202 and an
issuer cannot be required to recognize a security which con-
stitutes an over-issue. 3 Rather, the provisions of section 8-104
will in all cases govern situations where an over-issue has de-
veloped.
Replacement Provisions
An issuer who registers the transfer of a security upon an
unauthorized indorsement is subject to liability for improper
registration. 4 Section 8-404, which deals with improper regis-
tration by the issuer, provides that where an issuer has registered
a transfer of a security to a person not entitled to it, the issuer
on demand must deliver a like security, unless such delivery
would result in over-issue, in which case the issuer's liability is
governed by section 8-104. This is a specific example of how
section 8-104 governs all cases where an over-issue develops.
Section 8-405 is another example of how the issuer cannot
be exposed to over-issue. Where the owner of a security claims
it is lost, destroyed or wrongfully taken, the issuer must issue
a new security under certain circumstances. If later a bona fide
purchaser presents the security for transfer the issuer must reg-
ister it, if it would not result in over-issue. If registration would
result in over-issue, then section 8-104 governs the rights of the
bona fide purchaser.
63 UCC § 8-202, official comment 5.
64 UCC § 8-311.
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TRANS.ER .AND PURCHASE
Transfer
Part 3 of Article 8 deals with transfer, purchase, and rights
of successive holders or claimants to securities.
As against the transferor a transfer is complete upon de-
livery,65 and an indorsement without delivery is ineffectual as a
transfer.6 These factors are in accord with KRS sections 356.049
and 356.030.
The question remains: What constitutes a delivery? Sections
8-313 and 8-314 should be considered together in answering
this question. Section 8-313 contains the general provisions
governing delivery to a purchaser. Under this section the con-
cept of delivery has been broadened to conform to modem con-
ditions under which the bulk of securities trading is done through
brokers and over organized exchanges. Delivery may be com-
pleted while the security is still in the hands of the broker. When
factual situations described in subsection (1) (a), (b) and (d)
occur, delivery to the purchaser is completed, and no interven-
ing notice of adverse claims before the purchaser takes actual
physical possession can divest him of his rights. Thus, a pur-
chaser has obtained delivery when possession has actually vested
in him, or under certain circumstances, when his broker obtains
possession of the security or sends the purchaser a confirmation
of the purchase. This places the concept of delivery in line with
actual practice and understanding in financial circles.
Section 8-314 states the rights and duties of the parties in-
volved in the transfer of a security from the original transferor
to the ultimate purchaser. Subsection (1) places emphasis upon
security transfers effected on organized exchanges or through
brokers, since they handle the great majority of sales. Subsec-
tion (1) contemplates all parties who might be involved in a
transfer between brokers, including correspondent brokers, and
recognizes that a selling broker may make delivery by clearing
the sale through a clearing agency in accordance with the rules
of the exchange. Subsection (2) provides that a person who
delivers a security to a purchaser in a transaction not consum-
mated on an exchange or through brokers must make physical
65 UCC § 8-807.
66 UCC § 8-309.
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delivery. This requirement is not satisfied by placing the security
in transit, unless otherwise agreed.
Rights Acquired on Transfer
Upon delivery or transfer a purchaser acquires the rights
which his transferor had, except that he cannot improve his posi-
tion if he was previously a party to any fraud affecting the
security or who as a prior holder had notice of an adverse claim. 67
This restates the "shelter rule" of the NIL, but changes it in
that a former holder with knowledge of an adverse claim takes
subject to it. A bona fide purchaser not only acquires the rights
of a purchaser, but acquires the security free from any adverse
claim. An "adverse claim" includes a claim that a transfer was
or would be wrongful or that a particular person is the owner
of or has an interest in the security, either legal or equitable.
This section views the concept of negotiability from two aspects:
issuer's defenses and adverse claims. Any purchaser for value
of a security without notice of a defect may take free of an
issuer's defenses based on that defect, but only a purchaser
taking for value without notice of any adverse claim takes free
of adverse claims. The bona fide purchaser concerned here is
one who takes free of adverse claims. This is in accord with KRS
section 356.057 which provides that a holder in due course
takes free from any defect of title or claims by the prior parties.
Section 8-301 appears to be a rephrasing of existing law, estab-
lishing a uniform policy for all investment securities, except that
the protection extended to a bona fide purchaser does not turn
on the security's negotiability as it does under the NIL.
Under 8-307 where a security in registered form has been
delivered to a purchaser without a necessary indorsement he
has a specifically enforceable right to any necessary indorse-
ment. This is in accord with existing Kentucky law.68 A proper
indorsement is one of the requisites of registration which a pur-
chaser has the right to obtain.69
Pursuant to section 8-316 the purchaser is entitled to requi-
sites for registration from the transferor. Such requisites may in-
clude signature guarantees, proof of authority to transfer, transfer
67 UCC § 8-301.
s KRS § 356.049.
69 UCC § 8-316.
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stamps, etc. Registration is extremely important to the purchaser
and this section affords needed protection. If the transferor
fails to perform his duty, the purchaser may rescind the transfer
or in the proper case sue for specific performance, such as ob-
taining a necessary indorsement under section 8-307.
Purchaser for Value
A purchaser for value not only obtains the rights of the trans-
feror under section 8-301, and the rights to the requisites for
registration under section 8-316, but also certain warranties
from the transferor and other persons under sections 8-306 and
8-312. Under these sections a transferor (including a broker)
warrants to a purchaser for value that (1) his transfer is effec-
tive and rightful; (2) the security is genuine (free from counter-
feiting or forgery); and (3) that he knows no fact which might
impair the validity of the security. This is in accord with similar
warranties contained in the NIL.70 Also, pursuant to section
8-317 a purchaser for value may sue on the warranties of a guar-
antor of a signature or the guarantor of an indorsement, pro-
vided he relies upon them.
Bona Fide Purchaser
As provided in section 8-302 a bona fide purchaser is a pur-
chaser for value in good faith without notice of any adverse
claim who takes delivery of a security in bearer or registered
form issued to him or indorsed to him in blank. Such purchaser
takes free of adverse claims (legal or equitable) as defined in
section 8-301.
The question then arises as to what circumstances may give
rise to notice of adverse claims? Under section 8-304 a purch-
aser is charged with notice of adverse claims if: (1) the security
has been indorsed "for collection" or "for surrender" or some
purpose not involving transfer; or (2) the security is in bearer
form and in unambiguous terms states that it is the property of a
person other than the transferor. The mere writing of a name
is not enough. If the purchaser has notice that the security is
held for a third person or is registered in the name of or in-
dorsed by a fiduciary, it does not create a duty of inquiry into
the rightfulness of the transfer or constitute notice of adverse
7oKRS § 356.065.
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claims. If the purchaser has reason to know the benefits are
for the individual benefit of the fiduciary, then the purchaser
is charged with notice of adverse claims.
Under this section there are three circumstances where a
purchaser as a matter of law will be charged with notice of
adverse claims. These circumstances are not exhaustive and do
not exclude other situations in which the trier of facts may
determine that notice has been given. Subsection (a) dealing
with a restrictive indorsement follows KRS section 356.037
which provides that a subsequent indorsee acquires only the
title of the first indorsor under a restrictive indorsement. The
circumstances under subsection 1(b) where a bearer security
contains an unambiguous statement that it is the property of
one other than the transferor, also seems to be in accord with
prior Kentucky law. Such statement would certainly impose
a duty of inquiry under the NIL or would be knowledge of such
facts that "taking the instrument amounts to bad faith."71 Sub-
section (2) provides for the situation where one described or
identified as a fiduciary is the transferor. The mere fact that
the transferor is a fiduciary will not place the purchaser on notice
of adverse claims, but if the purchaser has reason to know that
the proceeds are being used by or that the transaction is for the
benefit of the fiduciary, the purchaser is charged with notice
of adverse claims. This is in accord with a similar section in
Article 3 regarding notice to a holder where a fiduciary is in-
volved.72 It should be noted that as to the question of notice
the objective test of the reasonable man is applied, with the
corresponding rejection of the test of actual knowledge or
bad faith as prescribed by the NIL. The notice test is therefore
an "objective one" as opposed to the "subjective" test under prior
Kentucky law.
Pursuant to section 8-305, under some circumstances a party
may be a bona fide purchaser of a mature instrument and yet
take free of adverse claims. This section is analogous to section
8-203, where in some cases a purchaser after maturity may
take free from defenses of the issuer. Under the NIL a pur-
chaser had to take the instrument prior to maturity in order to
be entitled to the status of a holder in due course. This section
71 KRS § 856.056.
72 UC § 3-304.
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makes it clear that the mere fact of maturity will not of itself
preclude a purchaser from being a bona fide purchaser and
thereby take free of adverse claims. Section 8-305 does pre-
scribe time limits after which the fact of staleness is regarded
as notice of adverse claims of ownership. A person may still
be a bona fide purchaser if he takes within one year of maturity,
or six months after maturity in situations where funds are avail-
able for payment on that date. Notice of default never con-
stitutes notice of a possible adverse claim, since to provide other-
wise would be contrary to the recognized practice of trading.
in defaulted securities.
Under section 8-310 indorsement of a security in bearer form
may give notice of adverse claims, but does not otherwise affect
any right to registration the holder may possess. An example
would be where the security is subject to a restrictive indorse-
ment (section 8-304), such as "for collection." In such case the
purchaser is charged with notice of adverse claims, but this in
no way operates to interfere with any right he may have to
registration.
Miscellaneous Provisions
(1) Action against purchaser for wrongful transfer. Pursuant
to section 8-315 an owner may reclaim a security or new security
evidencing the same right where the transfer is wrongful, or
have damages against anyone but a bona fide purchaser. If the
transfer is unlawful due to an unauthorized indorsement, and
the owner is not precluded from asserting its ineffectiveness,
he may reclaim the security or new security even from a bona
fide purchaser, provided that such purchaser has not obtained
a new, reissued, or reregistered security on registration of trans-
fer.73 The right to reclaim possession may be specifically enforced
and the transfer of the security enjoined. The general rule allow-
ing an owner to reclaim possession of a security wrongfully trans-
ferred is continued by this section.74
(2) Attachment of levy upon security. Set out in section 8-317
are the conditions which must prevail in order that a valid at-
tachment or levy upon a security may be effective. A valid levy
cannot be made under any circumstances without physical
73 UCC § 8-311.
74 See KRS § 274.070.
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seizure of the security. Even though the creditor gets an in-
junction to obtain control of the security, the security itself
must be reached in order that there be a valid levy. This section
is a change insofar as KRS section 247.180 permitted a levy or
attachment without actual seizure if transfer by the holder had
been enjoined. The purpose of the present section is to elim-
inate the possibility that a holder may transfer a security in
violation of an injunction and thereby impair the rights of the
purchaser. Subsection (2) which lends to the creditor the ap-
propriate aids afforded by courts in obtaining a levy or attach-
ment is identical with KRS section 247.140.
(3) No conversion by good faith delivery of agent. An agent
or bailee who in good faith has received securities and sold,
pledged or delivered them according to the instructions of his
principal is not liable for conversion even though the principal
had no right to dispose of them.75 The obvious purpose of this
section is to protect brokers and agents who act in good faith from
actions for conversion based upon wrongful transfer.
(4) Statute of frauds. Section 8-319 effects several material
changes in present statute of frauds provisions. A contract for
the sale of securities is not enforceable unless:
(1) there is some writing signed by the party to be charged
which indicates a contract has been made for sale of a stated
quantity of disclosed securities at a defined or stated price, or
(2) delivery of security has been accepted or payment made,
but the contract is enforceable only to the extent of payment
or delivery, or
(8) within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of
sale or purchase, which meets the requirements of definiteness,
has been received by the party to be charged and he fails to send
written objection within ten (10) days of receipt, or
(4) the party to be charged admits by pleading, testimony
or otherwise that a definite contract was made.
The changes affected by this section are: (1) any contract
for sale of securities is covered regardless of amount, (2) en-
forcement on the basis of part payment or part delivery is ob-
tainable only to the extent of such part payment or part delivery,
75 UCC § 8-318.
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(3) the contract is enforceable against a party who received
confirmation of sale or purchase and failed to send a written
objection to it within ten (10) days. It would seem reasonable
to require a customer to raise his objection, if any, within ten
days.
Section 8-308 continues the simplified method of indorse-
ment of securities set forth in KRS section 274.200 and is in
accord with the NIL rule that an indorsement "must be written
on the instrument itself or upon a paper attached thereto." This
section provides for special or blank indorsements, as did the
NIL,76 and also defines a special indorsement as one which
specifies a person to whom the security is to be transferred, or
who has the power to transfer. This definition of special indorse-
ment is broadened to include a person having power to transfer.
Under provisions of this article, failure of a fiduciary to comply
with the law of the state controlling the fiduciary relationship,
including any law requiring the fiduciary to obtain court ap-
proval of the transfer, does not make his indorsement unauthor-
ized. Kentucky requires such prior approval for sales of secur-
ities from an estate. This section would protect a bona fide
purchaser in this situation.
Waranties of Indorsor
An indorsor is held to the warranties provided in section
8-306 that: (1) his transfer is effective and rightful; (2) the
security is genuine and not materially altered; and (3) he knows
no fact which might impair the validity thereof. However, un-
less otherwise agreed, the indorsor by his indorsement assumes
no obligation that the security will be honored by the issuer.7
This changes the NIL rule which provided that an indorsor
engaged himself to pay the amount of the instrument to the
holder. The purpose of this section is to prevent the indorsor
from being a guarantor of performance by the issuer. Also, an
indorsement purporting to be only to part of a security, intended
by the issuer to be separately transferable, is effective only to
76 KRS § 356.033.
77KRS § 895.200.
78UCC § 8-808(4).
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the extent of the indorsement."9 This latter qualification of the
effect of indorsement seems to be contrary to the NIL rule which
required that the indorsement be of the entire instrument.
80
Unauthorized Indorsement
Pursuant to section 8-811 an owner may assert the ineffective-
ness of an unauthorized indorsement against the issuer or any
purchaser other than a bona fide purchaser who has in good
faith received a new, reissued or reregistered security on regis-
tration, provided, of course, that the owner has not ratified the
indorsement or is otherwise precluded from asserting its in-
effectiveness.
Guaranty of Indorsement
A person guaranteeing the signature of an indorser warrants
that the signature is genuine, that the signer is an appropriate
person to sign and that the signer has legal capacity to sign.81
The guarantor makes no other warranty as the rightfulness of
the transfer. However, a guarantor of the indorsement warrants
not only the things the guarantor of a signature does, but also
warrants the rightfulness of the particular transfer. These war-
ranties are made to any person dealing with the security in reli-
ance on the guaranty and the guarantor is liable for loss re-
sulting from breach of the warranties. This latter provision is
designed to encourage issuers to rely upon signature guarantees
so as to avoid waste of time and effort in checking the facts
guaranteed. It should be noted that though an issuer may re-
quire guarantee of a signature as a requisite to registration,
82
it may not require a guarantee of an indorsement.
PIGISTRATION OF TEANSm
Duty of Issuer to Register
Part 4 of Article 8 is devoted to provisions governing regis-
tration of securities with the issuing corporation. Emphasis is
placed upon the obligations, rights and duties of the issuer in
respect to registering a security.
70UCC § 8-308(5).
80KRS § 356.032.
81 UCC § 8-308.
82 UCC § 8-402.
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Section 8-401 defines it to be the duty of the issuer to
register a security when presented with a request to register
a transfer, if the following conditions concur: (1) the security
is indorsed by proper persons; (2) reasonable assurance is given
that indorsements are genuine and effective; (8) the issuer has
no duty to inquire into adverse claims, or has discharged said
duty; (4) any law relating to collection of taxes has been com-
plied wtih; (5) the transfer is in effect rightful or is to a bona
fide purchaser. If the issuer is found to be under a duty to
transfer, and he refused to, he is also liable for loss resulting
from any unreasonable delay in registration, or from refusal
to register.
"Issuer" has a narrower connotation for purposes of regis-
tration, since it denotes the company or government whose
security is involved, and therefore the word is not as broad as
it is used in Part 2 dealing with issuer's rights, duties and re-
sponsibilities.
The conditions imposed by section 8-401 as prerequisites
to a duty on the part of an issuer to register the transfer are
generally in accord with present rules regarding the issuer's
duty to transfer. As already stated the issuer may incur liability
for improper registration on an unauthorized signature,83 or
where the indorsement is not that of an appropriate person, u
and generally under circumstances where the issuer is deemed
to have had notice of an adverse claim. Other than the duties
imposed by this section, an issuer's potential liability for wrong-
ful registration of transfer has been substantially reduced.
Issuer's Rights
In order that an issuer may be able to protect himself from
an action based on wrongful registration of transfer, he is given
the right to demand certain assurances that each necessary in-
dorsement is genuine and effective. The issuer may require the
following assurances: (1) a guarantee of the signature of the
person indorsing; (2) appropriate assurances of an agent's author-
ity to sign; (8) where the indorsement is by a fiduciary, assur-
ances of legal capacity; (4) where more than one fiduciary is
involved, reasonable assurances that all who are required to sign
83UCC § 8-811.
84 UCC § 8-308.
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have done so; and (5) if indorsement not governed by foregoing,
assurances appropriate to the particular caseY5 If the issuer has
notice "that the transfer may be wrongful" it may require a
reasonable assurance beyond that just specified. What would be
reasonable would depend on the particular circumstances of each
case. This section is completely new to Kentucky law, there being
no statute or case law governing such assurances.
Where a security has been lost, destroyed or wrongfully
taken and the owner fails to notify the issuer of that fact within
a reasonable time, if the issuer -registers a transfer before re-
ceiving notification, the owner is precluded from asserting a
claim based on wrongful transfer, or for a new security. How-
ever, if an owner does give adequate notification, the issuer is
under a duty to issue a new security in its place provided the re-
quest is made before the issuer has notice that a bona fide pur-
chaser has acquired the security or a sufficient indemnity bond
is filed with the issuer and all other reasonable requirements
imposed by the issuer are met. This changes prior law in that
a court order is not required to obtain issuance of a new security
where the original one has been lost, destroyed or stolen. After
issue of a new security the issuer must register a transfer to a
bona fide purchaser, unless registration would result in over-
issue, in which case the issuer's liability is governed by the
provision on over-issue. If such should occur the issuer may
recover the new security from the person to whom it was issued,
except a bona fide purchaser holding under him.
Adverse Claims and Duty of Inquiry
Under section 8-403 if the issuer has notice of an adverse
claim (a claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful or that
a particular person is the owner of a legal or equitable interest
in the security) he has a duty to make a reasonable inquiry into
the claim. He may discharge such duty by notifying the adverse
party that the security has been presented for transfer and that
it will be registered if within thirty (30) days no appropriate
court order is served or no sufficient indemnity bond is received.
Except to the extent the issuer has notice of an adverse claim
he is under no duty to inquire as to whether there are adverse
85UCC § 8-402(1).
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claims. Section 8-403 sets out specific situations under which
the issuer has no duty to make such inquiry.
Section 8-404 expressly exonerates the issuer from an action
for wrongful transfer if in fact the necessary indorsements were
on the security, and the issuer had no duty to inquire into ad-
verse claims or had discharged that duty under section 8403.
Duty of Authenticating Trustee, Transfer Agent or Registrar
Such persons have a duty to exercise good faith and due
diligence in acting for an issuer. They have the rights of the issuer
in regard to registration of transfer and must exercise good faith
and due diligence toward a holder or owner of a security.
Notice to these persons is notice to the issuer with respect to
functions performed as agent.8 6 Thus, transfer agents, registrars
and the like are held liable to the issuer and the owner for
wrongful registration of a transfer. This fact rejects the idea that
these parties are mere agents and are not separately liable to
the owner for nonfeasance such as wrongful refusal to register
a transfer.
CONCLUSION
The adoption of Article 8 is a progressive step forward in
Kentucky law. It provides uniform treatment of transfers of
investment securities which heretofore had been left compar-
atively unguided. Especially was this true with regard to reg-
istered bonds which had never fit comfortably within the con-
fines of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Though there are sev-
eral areas of the law which will necessarily be subject to judicial
interpretation, Article 8 will prove to be an enactment of the
better substantive law in this area.
86 UCC § 8-406.
